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ABSTRACT
The article considers key factors and directions of the value-institutional 
evolution of Modernity as a political project. It is argued that the movement 
of humankind towards the globalised world paradoxically turned not into a 
denial, but rather into a consistent radicalisation of the axiological political 
foundations of Modernity. The thesis of the axiological unity and institutional 
diversity of global Modernity is advanced in opposition to the concept 
of pluralist modernity as a rhetorically veiled civilisational approach. It is 
asserted that the constant self-adjustment of the central value system of 
globalised Modernity is carried out in the context of a non-simultaneity 
effect, providing grounds for discussions about the insurmountability of 
pre-modern cultural barriers and traditions of different civilisations. The 
conclusion is justified that the success of the globalisation of Modernity 
is contingent upon the possibility of building out the already existing 
world economy to include world politics, since the economic assimilation 
of the world by capitalism has largely outstripped the counterbalancing 
possibilities of its global political regulatory and compensatory systems, 
contributing to the intensification of conflicts and various inequalities. The 
increasingly intensive interaction and interdependence of humanity at the 
global level first implies the creation of ethical mechanisms of world politics 
based on concern for the interests of humanity as a whole. In seeking the 
solution to this problem, it is increasingly necessary to go beyond archaised 
political forms and the logic of decision-making that relates to territorial 
nation-states. In the discussion about the ethical and political values 
and institutions of the global, second or late Modernity, the positionsof 
those subjects capable of presenting a moral game to humanity –  
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open, egalitarian, universal, cosmopolitan approaches for solving general 
problems – will be a priori strengthened.
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The fundamental importance of Modernity as a central problem for the social sciences 
cannot be overemphasised. According to the figurative expression of E. Hobsbawm, 
it was during the twentieth century that 80% of the Earth’s population finally parted 
company with the Middle Ages and stepped into modern society. This is a society 
oriented toward the scientific mastering of nature and freedom to control one’s own 
destiny. Modernity is the most ideological problem of the social sciences, the response 
to which is used to designate all other axiological, ontological and notional hierarchies. 
While we are all located in Modernity, its constantly changing face can be seen 
differently depending on the historical stage of a particular society and the subject 
of its interpretation. While sharing some common features, the versions of Modernity 
of the 18th and 19th centuries and at the beginning and end of the 20th century can be 
differentiated in a number of key aspects. It is the dream of all political and philosophical 
doctrines, state power apparatuses and social forces to exert an effective intellectual 
monopoly over Modernity, due to the concomitant ability to legitimatise certain topical 
socio-political, cultural and economic orders. However, it is impossible to furnish a 
universal definition of a continuous or unfinished Modernity (Habermas, 2005) within 
which one is located without also presenting that position within the coordinates of the 
socio-political, economic and historical context in which the observer thinks. At the 
same time, the reflection of one’s own social engagement and partiality naturally turns 
into a falsification of any universal concepts and systems of legitimacy that appeal to 
Modernity. The political project of Modernity presents itself as a globally dominant, 
historically heterogeneous and far from exhausted political and historical project. 
Since Modernity is an unfinished project, it cannot be thought of as a whole or as the 
subject of a final historical outcome. However, we can learn a lot about the Modernity, 
contemporary society and ourselves if we are able to understand the internal changes 
that the value-institutional political order of Modernity has undergone over the past 
several centuries.
 Concerning the genesis, transformation, possible alternatives and threats to the 
dominant political project of Modernity, we can formulate the following interrelated 
sequence of theses.
I
Historically, the political project of Modernity came to supersede the Ancien Régime 
(old order), showing the construction of the social order for the first time and justifying 
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its autonomy from the unchanging divine order. Traditional societies are fundamentally 
distinguished from their modern equivalents in terms of the rate of social change. 
Before Modernity, the rate of change was so small that during one generation the 
changes were almost invisible, creating a general illusion that no changes at all 
had taken place since the creation of the world. Therefore, the speed of change in 
contemporary society – in which, in fact, only the habitual way of life changes, i.e. its 
rituals, symbols and values – can seem almost like blasphemy from the point of view 
of pre-modern social groups.
 The speed of social change makes it clear that all societies are explicitly 
constructed. As a result, the main object of criticism of Modernity is the uncovering of its 
ontological and axiological variability as well as the constructed nature of different social 
forces, interpreted in the context of the sacral tradition as inauthenticity, simulacrality, 
deconstruction, denial of God, distortion of sacred foundations, etc. Nevertheless, it can 
be remarked that tradition differs only in the sense that the drawing up of its design is lost 
in a historical timescale. Abolishing the earthly order is justified by the fact that it is a copy 
of the divine; consequently, every social evil has an apologia on the basis that everything 
real is reasonable. However, unpredictable results may ensue from citizens and social 
groups legitimising their right to change the political order. Thus, the political order of 
Modernity resurrects the scenario of the construction of the Tower of Babel, in which the 
final goal of achieving the ideal (divine) order has not been lost, but is constantly divided 
due to the conflicts of alternative perspectives produced by constantly transforming 
social groups as analogues of Biblical languages. Hence the insurmountable theoretical 
uncertainty and incompleteness of Modernity as the mobile constellation of modern 
utopias and ideologies and the impossibility of their integration into a metanarrative, 
which hope J.-F. Lyotard associated with the state of postmodernism (Lyotard, 1979).
 A natural way of being for a modern society consists in permanent modernisation 
as a set of continuously improving changes. The desire for continuous innovation in 
itself is becoming a key – and perhaps the only – distinctive tradition of Modernity: 
‘Modernisation is a “way of existence” in modernity, and it cannot end, at least until 
“modernity” is complete.’ (Kapustin, 1998) In this case, in order to correspond to the 
prevailing principles of the maximisation of collective usefulness,  any innovations 
must be publicly controlled and legitimated by being the object of a wide, constantly 
confirmed dynamic consensus of key social groups. Therefore, modernisation is a 
continuous process, carried out under fundamentally incomplete conditions of freedom 
and in the absence of social forces that can achieve a zero sum victory once and for 
all. Furthermore, this process is not identical to the movement towards an ideal final 
state, which often seems to be embodied in one or another political reality.
 The Modernist project announced the universality of the human mind and the 
intelligibility of social and moral laws, leading to Weber’s disenchantment of the world. 
In the ethical field, it is the project of independent rational substantiation of morals 
(MacIntyre, 1981); in the political sphere, the universal legislation of reason. At the 
heart of the political project of Modernity lies the desire to develop universal political 
legislation for all mankind. The problem is that the class differentiation of the Modern 
society presented a set of diametrically opposed versions of morality and reason, 
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which are the result of the free self-determination of peoples, each of which, while 
striving for universal legislation, is at the same time an expression of particular political 
interests. An objective (universal) normative rationality (common goals, values, ideals) 
of the monologic political mind thus becomes impossible. However, without integral 
instrumental rationality, expressed in terms of the rules of the game – conflict and 
interaction of social interests – society itself, seen as an institutional, process-based 
compromise of interests, becomes impossible to sustain. It is for this reason that 
increasing attention has been paid both to new disciplinary practices and to dialogue – 
communication of social forces, mechanisms for achieving sustainable agreements 
(conventions) expressed in various democratic mechanisms and institutions (elections, 
referenda, direct participation of citizens in making power decisions: demonstrations, 
rallies, jury trials, citizens’ gatherings, public hearings, etc.).
 Under the conditions of Modernity, the political community for the first time 
developed a fundamentally incomplete system of methods for resolving internal 
conflicts that allow for periodic review of the terms of the social contract, i.e., dominant 
social forces are given legitimacy for a limited time period. This allows the abandonment 
of extreme political interactions, in which the winner takes all, in favour of a system 
of political decision making related to cooperative, dialogical, solidary strategies of 
various social forces that allow the interests of different parties to be taken into account 
and society changed in a non-violent way.
 Modernity is often criticised by contemporaries both from the left, and from the 
right. Now as the iron cell of conformism (H. Marcuse), then as the tyranny of the 
egoistic mind, leading to a dehumanising depreciation of human existence as well as to 
totalitarianism. Thus, it seems that the real situation is more complicated. In achieving 
more rapid thematisation, modern theories and collective practices sharply increased 
the sensitivity of society itself to political problems of power, hierarchy, resource 
distribution, justice, freedom and solidarity in the context of unavoidable contradictions 
of group interests. These are political problems that have always existed; however, it 
is only under the glare of contemporary theoretical optics that they have become the 
focus of attention, bringing their historical character to light. In this way, it is shown that 
these problems are not eternal and can, in principle, be variably resolved by active 
constituents of the political order. 
II
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most classics of European 
social thought analysed modern society at the ontological level according to the concepts 
of universal transition: from agrarian feudalism to industrial capitalism (K. Marx), 
from traditional to modern society (M. Weber), from organic to mechanical solidarity 
(E. Durkheim), from community to society (F. Tönnies), from military to industrial 
society (H. Spencer), etc. Thus, almost all the classical socio-political macro-theories 
that comprehend the transition to Modernity – and the condition of modernity itself – 
are built on the identification of evolutionary stages of development thus forming a type 
of binary time code, one of whose branches has a privileged position with respect to 
the future, and the other personifying the past. While this transition actually did take 
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place on a global scale, the Modernist project historically did not end there, setting in 
motion complex processes of internal differentiation.
 In institutional terms, Modernity is expressed in the complexity of the social 
subsystems – economics, politics, science, art, etc. – each of which acquires a certain 
autonomy, with its own value system and language of description. At the same time, 
Modernity does not entirely displace previous social relations. The value system of 
Modernity functions in parallel with the previous norms of social regulation, gradually 
coming to displace and replace them. Thus, along with reciprocal and distributive 
exchanges, patrimonial political order and patron-client relations of elites of different 
levels, are formed civil nation-states, a self-regulating market, rational bureaucracy, 
mass parties, trade unions, civil organisations, representative bodies of government, 
etc. In all modern societies, without exception, we can observe the simultaneity of 
coexistence and the imposition into various spheres of life of reciprocal (gift-exchange, 
family, clan), distributive and market relations, as well as a long-term, gradual change in 
their correlation in favour of the latter. New social norms and regulators seldom replace 
the old all at once. Typically, this displacement takes the form of a transplant, when the 
values of Modernity at the institutional level are partially mixed with those of an obsolete 
cultural tradition. Thus, the displacement of old values in the historical perspective 
creates transitional institutional effects, which are often erroneously explained in terms 
of the cultural and civilisational specifics (uniqueness) of a particular society.
 Now, the problem of global transformation of the model of national, class-industrial 
and predominantly Western Modernity into the late, post-national, cosmopolitan 
Modernity is at the centre of discussions. In the world as a whole, the national model 
of Modernity, which derives habitual everyday life from historical social ideals and 
utopias, is becoming increasingly irrelevant for describing the actual socio-political and 
cultural regimes of a large part of mankind in the twenty-first century. Transformations 
of the basic national model of Modernity were facilitated by: 
 – the saturation points of global markets and intensification of non-market 
competition, leading to the crisis of idealised capitalism; 
 – another technological revolution related to automation and robotics; 
acceleration of the dynamics of changes in late-modern societies without 
economic growth or mass labour; 
 – transformation of the social structure of society and the principles of its 
stratification, ever less connected with the market; 
 – an increase in the internal heterarchy and heterotopy of territorial nation-
states due to various internal and external challenges; 
 – multiplication and strengthening of non-governmental political subjects in the 
globalised world (TNK, city networks etc.). 
 However, despite convincing criticism, Modernity remains the basic political 
model for the relevant description and legitimisation of global cultural and economic-
political reality, which has not yet been pushed to the periphery of history by 
alternative political projects. For this reason, despite the constantly observed 
institutional and axiological changes, leading researchers emphasise that when 
we refer to the realities of our society we are nevertheless dealing with Modernity, 
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be it the singular modernity of F. Jamieson, the fluid modernity of Z. Bauman, 
the hyper-modernity of A. Turena, the cosmopolitan, second or late Modernity of 
U. Beck or A. Giddens’ concept of radical Modernity. In the globalised world, the 
intensity of intellectual challenges to Modernity is growing from the side of the 
post-industrial, post-Ford, networked information society, knowledge society, etc. 
(Postfordism, 2015). However, the main challenge is not merely institutional, but 
a more universal value-ethical challenge, whose sources are more widely defined. 
As a result, none of the concepts that claimed a global alternative to Modernity 
were able to displace it from the dominant positions. These include postmodernism, 
post-industrialism, communism, alterglobalism, world empire (M. Hardt & A. Negri), 
religious fundamentalism, civilisational theories, theories of autarky and isolationism 
and a variety of utopian and traditionalist projects (Fishman, 2008).
 It should be noted that the most heuristic critical challenge to the political paradigm 
of Modernism was issued by postmodernism. Persuasive examples of the axiological 
and methodological criticism of the theories of Modernity can be found in the works of 
J. Baudrillard, J. Derrida, J. Deleuze, J.-F. Lyotard and others. For example, Jameson 
argues that the intellectual map of Modernity has largely developed its heuristic 
potential in social theory terms, to all intents and purposes becoming a synonym for 
capitalism. However, in throwing a real challenge to Modernity, postmodernism itself 
failed to become a global utopia, merely morphing into the instrumental cultural logic 
of late capitalism (Jameson, 1991). Over time, postmodern theories, which initially 
claimed to represent a global alternative to the value core of Modernity, came to be 
reabsorbed into it on the basis of critical self-reflection.
 Postmodernism revealed and studied the dark side of Modernity from a theoretical 
perspective (J. Baudrillard). Postmodern theories turned out to be heuristically strong in 
the study of various kinds of breaks, boundaries, peripheries and cultural contradictions 
of the political project of Modernity, connected with criticism and challenges directed 
by various peripheries (geographic, economic, cultural) at the prevailing values 
and centres. However, postmodernism was unable to offer a global postmodern 
political project, since it lacks the ability to generate universality and totality in the 
area of values and aims. The hierarchical values and principles of a political attitude, 
structured around the criticism of any overwhelming periphery of centrism, proved to be 
unrealisable in practice. One of the networks or communications must remain ordering 
and dominant; otherwise, we are only dealing with a radical anarchism connected with 
a denial of the need for society as such. Thus, if Modernity is connected with individual 
and collective liberation as well as conscious and goal-oriented transformation of the 
world, postmodernism turns into forced reactive strategies connected with the adaptive 
accommodation of individuals and their groups to social, technological and axiological 
changes, over which they, in fact, do not exercise any power.
 The formation of the analytical model of late Modernity is carried out against the 
background of a historical non-simultaneity effect, at a time when some regions of 
the world are entering the postindustrial stage of Modernity, while others are merely 
living through the process of being forced to play catch up with modernisation and 
the institutional adaptation to Modernity in the form of nation-states. The classical 
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programmes of social knowledge of the original era of Modernity were oriented towards 
the nation-state as the legitimate political form of its practical embodiment. It is for this 
reason that Marx could still draw upon English political economy, German philosophy 
and French utopianism. Under the conditions of globalised or late Modernity, any 
national schools or theoretical models of social knowledge lose their self-sufficiency. 
Nations become only private or special in comparison with universal laws, which are 
relevant only to the extent that they apply to humanity as a whole.
 At the same time, some popular theories, especially in the field of economics, 
continue to use ontological modifications of the classical transit discourse no longer in 
substantiating the transition to it, but in describing the very formation and subsequent 
transformations of Modernity. For example, D. Nort, D. Wallace and B. Wyngast 
describe modernisation as a transition from the natural state to the open access society, 
carried out by means of a transformation of the interaction of elites. The latter cease 
to be closed and begin to be guided by impersonal rules (North et al., 2009). A similar 
course of thought is present in D. Acemoğlu and D. Robinson, who describe the history 
of modernisation as an institutional transformation of societies in which extractive 
institutions are dominant, to societies with a predominance of inclusive institutions 
(Acemoglu, Robinson, 2012). However, more insightful and more convincing in this 
discourse are the optimistic ideas of R. Inglehart and K. Welzel based on many years 
of global sociological surveys on the transformations taking place in the value systems 
of modern societies. They consist in a justification of the general transition from the 
material survival values guaranteed for the majority of citizens during the deployment of 
the early industrial Modernity to the postmaterial values of self-realisation, associated 
with post-industrial societies (Inglehart, Welzel, 2005).
 In a radical and idealised form, the concept of universal transition was applied 
by the apologist of the end of history F. Fukuyama, who attempted to argue that all 
modern societies move “naturally” in the direction of the domination of the market and 
liberal democracy (Fukuyama 1992). Supporters of the movement towards the flat 
earth and end of history present rationales for the ethical and political unification of 
mankind, with globalisation being interpreted as the erasure of pre-modern cultural 
differences (J. Bhagwati, T. Friedman, I. Wallerstein, A. Maddison, A. Touraine, 
V. Inozemtsev, F. Fukuyama and others). Accordingly, continuing Modernity can be 
adequately explained only from within its own value coordinates. And the more we are 
unable to explain the observed diversity in the logic of Modernity itself, the more it will 
not turn out in the framework of the more localist and irrational discourse of civilisation 
that Modernity has supplanted into the field of history. 
 Finally, there have been enough productive and, perhaps, too hasty attempts 
by Z. Bauman and U. Beck to model a late-modern society from the latest – however 
unstable – trends, individual signs and changes in the outlook (Bauman, 2000; Beck, 
1992). In this same connection, there are concepts that predict the turn of modern 
society towards new mechanisms of self-organisation. Such include, for example, 
concepts of the post-industrial society, post-Fordism (S. Lash, J. Urry et al.), the 
network society (M. Castells, A. Bard, et al.) and information society (D. Bell, E. Toffler, 
F. Webster, V. Inozemtsev, et al.) – all of which had a significant impact on public 
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opinion at the end of the twentieth century. However, these theories turned out to 
be too hastily grounded in some peripheral tendencies in social development, which 
consequently turned into utopias with overvalued social expectations. Theories of the 
information society, knowledge society or creative class turned out to be somewhat 
naively optimistic, a pie whose slices were not intended for dividing equally among all 
societies and classes, and implying a rather more rapid transition to the future than the 
actual capabilities of even the most advanced modern societies.
III
In its most general form, the value kernel of the political project of Modernity 
represents the historically mobile construction of interrelated narratives that organise 
the institutional space of a post-traditional society. First, it consists in an aggregate 
of modern ideologies/utopias, as well as the conflict inherent between their value 
justifications, representing the dynamics of the clash of social forces rooted in 
capitalism. This research tradition relies mainly on the classic works of K. Marx, 
K. Mannheim, A. Gramsci, H. Marcuse, F. Jameson and others, in which the appearance 
and transformation of Modernity is due to the new social ontology of capitalism and the 
class structure of society that it engenders.
 The basic modern political narratives are comprised of capitalism, liberalism 
and nationalism. Capitalism generates a constant increase in resources and assigns 
the dominant stratification of society into economic classes, each determined by its 
relation to the market. The strategy of obtaining moral and political compensation for 
the negative externalities and social costs of capitalism is implemented in the form of 
a constantly-revised liberal consensus (I. Wallerstein) appearing as a fundamental 
fusion within the institutionally implemented liberal normative field of different versions 
of conservatism, socialism and left-right radicalism. 
 Finally, the territorial national state acts as the dominant political form, combining 
the principles of territorial sovereignty, power apparatus and citizenship. The nation-
state permits the establishment of an acceptable balance between the market and 
the various background, non-economic factors that provide for its existence – which 
factors capitalism and its theories prefer to bracket out. This consists in a combination 
of capitalist production, exploitation, competition and the accumulation of capital with 
the institutional consolidation of a broad list of inalienable guarantees, rights and 
freedoms of citizens. 
 The concept of democracy, most consistently worked out in the Habermasian 
idea of communicative consensus, bears responsibility for the coordination and 
reconciliation of conflicting collective interests in a given modern society. The 
comprehension and legitimation of the constant changes of modern society as social 
norms are represented by the concepts of progress and revolution. The immanent 
theory of progress (modernisation) institutionally represents the differentiation of the 
new autonomous (self-referential) subsystems of an increasingly complex society, 
involving a delegation of the functions of social regulation and the power to produce 
norms. These narratives form the value and functional unity of Modernity along with 
the basis for its self-description, reproduction and legitimation of the social order. 
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 However, under the conditions of the historical evolution of modernity, each of 
the indicated narratives undergoes substantial changes. The narrative of liberalism 
demonstrates a tendency to abandon the liberal consensus of collective political 
interests a) on the basis of modern ideologies and b) within individual nations in favour 
of shaping the contours of global liberal ethics based on agreement on universal 
human rights and freedoms and the development of moral conventions for maintaining 
the legitimacy of post-national political institutions. A negative trend running in parallel 
to this is the loss of ideological content on the part of the liberal consensus. It thus 
begins to express itself, not at the level of ideology, but at lower rhetorical levels, e.g. 
those of common sense, populism and pragmatism. 
 The narrative of democracy is undergoing an evolution, with the principles of the 
dictatorship of the majority, the mobilisation of the masses and the expansion of the 
circle of citizens endowed with political rights giving way to problems of the coexistence 
of a multi-component society, access to civil rights and equal opportunities for citizens 
and immigrants. The evolution of the narrative of nationalism is connected with the 
movement from the sacralisation of territorial sovereignty to extraterritorial principles 
of open law and cosmopolitanism. Territorially organised nations in a flat world 
(T. Friedman) lose credibility in the field of developing dominant political values. Under 
conditions of reflexive modernity, global openness of borders and increasing mobility, 
the process of legitimation inevitably shifts from nations to humanity as a whole. 
 Thus, the political logic of nation-states no longer corresponds to the increasingly 
intensive interaction and interdependence of humanity at the global level. The transition 
to late Modernity is characterised by a kind of disintegration and loss of legitimacy 
on the part of normative nationalism in terms of unity of individual rights, collective 
autonomy of citizens and territorially limitations to sovereign space. The factor of 
space as a sacralisation of limited territory ceases to be significant. Accordingly, all 
nations as territorial communities are experiencing an increasing deficit of legitimacy. 
The same assertion relates to nationalism supporting territorial political communities 
as well as to concepts of sovereignty in terms of the historical, ethnic and linguistic 
proximity of members of the territorial community. In this way, the historical realisation 
of the utopia of national Modernity in the form of nation-states for the greater part of 
humanity simultaneously turns into its profanation as a consequence of the loss of the 
transcendental dimension to the political sphere. 
 In addition, if nationalism emerged as a historical means for integrating and 
internally unifying a heterogeneous political space during the centralisation of large 
states, now it can also be rethought as a way of protecting a particular society from 
the global expansion of the world economy, which polarises national communities and 
increases their dependence on external factors, actors and contexts of interaction. 
For a certain historical period, the effects of modernisation served to obscure the 
moral limitations and inhumane goal-orientedness of the capitalist world-system. The 
complete globalisation of capital and technological revolutions devaluing working 
people make it necessary to reconsider the classical narrative of capitalism associated 
with constant geographical expansion and market competition in favour of its rental 
models (Martianov, 2017).
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 It should be especially noted that the value kernel of the political project of 
Modernity is ambivalent: it is simultaneously a method of explanation, but also of 
remoralisation/legitimisation of practices within capitalism. Modern ideologies and 
utopias are designed to mitigate the permanent moral deficit provoked by capitalism 
under the conditions of the expansion of the limited model of homo economicus, which 
is absolutely inadequate for keeping society from decay (Martianov, 2017). In turn, 
capitalism tends to identify itself with Modernity by reducing it to neutral theories of 
modernisation, progress, development, specifically designed to mask the absence in 
it of any social goals and collective hopes (Jameson, 2009). Thus, capitalism does not 
have a general political goal or any socially utopian horizon and cannot therefore produce 
effective self-legitimation that relates to society as a whole. Therefore, capitalism has 
to resort to palliative options of non-economic justification of its economic practices, 
primarily to an identification with Modernity as the embodiment of the idea of the infinity 
of progress. Nethertheless, the original logic of the expansion of capitalism in terms 
of colonialism and progressorism [term introduced by the Strugatsky brothers] was 
subsequently subjected to substantiated criticism. Equally critical was the expansion 
of capitalism into all spheres of social life, which went beyond the limits of market 
exchanges, giving rise to the total commodification of all other social relations.
 In this context, the ideological genesis of political Modernity is evident from 
the crisis in Christian morality, which was caused by the birth and development 
of the capitalist world-system. First emerging in sixteenth century Europe and 
subsequently developed through the cycles of bourgeois revolutions, processes of 
colonisation (Westernisation) and globalisation of cultural, economic and mass media 
communications, the principles of the capitalist world system, freed from the limitations 
of traditional Christian morality, gradually came to embrace the whole world. 
 Founded by liberal consensus, the concept of human rights and freedoms has 
emerged as a distinctively post-traditional means by which Christian values in their 
humanistic interpretation can coexist with the functional logic of capitalism, which 
is largely built on the systematic violation of these values. Modern ideologies were 
used to substantiate hybrid intellectual constructions reconciling Christian principles 
of charity, equality, brotherhood and mutual assistance with the values of the market, 
competition, personal success, the endless accumulation of capital and the class 
inequality of people inherent in the social relations of the era of capitalism. As a 
consequence, the axiological field of Modernity is characterised by a duality that is not 
inherent in traditional societies: the gradual separation and autonomisation of private 
and public spheres in such a way that Christian morality still prevails in the field of 
private life, while the rules of the public sphere are determined by the more limited 
pragmatic or utilitarian morality of homo economicus.
 As an effective strategy for the constant ethical self-correction of Modernity, 
theories of justice are advanced in the field of political philosophy that allow a utopian 
dimension to be maintained. In terms of theories of justice in modern political thought, 
the theory of repair of late Modernity is gaining popularity in the context of maintaining 
the legitimacy of the status quo. However, from a future perspective, it is not the 
discourse of repair (J. Alexander), a return to an ethics of virtue (A. Macintyre) or the 
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preservation of some universal model of Modernity (F. Fukuyama) that is required, but 
the fundamental ability to construct ever more universal political and ethical grounds 
for Modernity’s existence.
IV
Concerning the continuing internal unity of the political project of Modernity, it is possible 
to assert its axiological integrity despite (or perhaps because of) the variability of its 
institutional implementation. Modernity can thus be viewed as an open constructor 
of values and the various possibilities for their interaction, including institutional. 
However, the presence of an axiological interpretation space neither abolishes the 
conceptual unity and finality of the value set of Modernity, nor its hierarchical structure. 
Otherwise, the very confirmation or recognition of the political project of Modernity as 
a holistic concept and/or phenomenon would be extremely difficult if not impossible 
(Wagner, 2008).
 In the course of the historical evolution of Modernity, it is possible to observe 
the successive processes of its disengagement with the European version, which 
has nevertheless continued to assert itself as canonical and the only correct one in 
the discourses of colonialist theories that refer to catching up with modernisation, 
Westernisation, civilisation and transitology. Postnational Modernity, then, consists 
in a geographical extension to the whole world of its original European model, which 
has rid itself of its particular cultural and historical content and traditions in favour 
of political ideas and institutions that have become universal. At the global level, 
post-national Modernity jettisons its nontransitive, unique features in favour of such 
properties that are actually universalisable through building on any previous traditions 
and cultures. 
 However, while postnational Modernity may be normatively universal, in terms of 
an institutional plan for the realisation of its value kernel it is quite heterogeneous. This 
competition of institutional versions of Modernism is a prerequisite for its flexible, non-
regulatory and competitive development throughout the world. The non-simultaneous 
development of Modernity in different parts of the world was conditioned by the fact 
that, in addition to the European version, all the later versions of the institutionalisation 
of a modern society already had ready-made models of modernity to which reference 
could be made in entering into various cultural conflicts and interrelations.
 Thus, if the initial cultural-historical nucleus of Modernity was determined by the 
West, then, concerning the growing cultural indifference of post-national Modernity, 
it can be subsequently argued to have achieved autonomy from path dependence 
(dependence on the previous development), something that is confirmed by many 
examples of the effective modernisation of states and regions culturally different from 
Europe. In searching for the social laws of modern society, the globalisation of Modernity 
confirms the greater relevance of the formational argumentation approach of the 
Hegelian-Marxist philosophy of history than the positions of the civilisational theories 
(Ch. Taylor, S. Huntington, P. Buchanan, J. Thompson, etc.), which emphasise the 
importance of cultural differences between societies. Moreover, attempts to synthesise 
the formational and civilisational approaches into a third entity, for example, taking the 
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form of the sociocultural approach embodied by the concept of multiple modernities 
(S. Eisenstadt, J. Arnason, W. Schluchter, B. Wittrock, etc.) are heuristically less 
satisfactory and methodologically more contradictory (Eisenstadt 2000). The main 
methodological problem of these theories is that ideas based on the idea of a particular 
civilisational norm necessarily describe the entire diversity of societies that fit into 
them only as temporary deviations. As a rule, however, deviations do not disappear 
in the course of time, but continue to accumulate, while the legitimacy of the norm 
itself is not questioned, including also for the civilisation that spawned its historical 
model; nevertheless, it inexorably retreated more and more from it. Undoubtedly, 
during the expansion and intensification of Modernity there are receding waves and 
rejectionist reactions to excessively rapid processes of catching up or the authoritarian 
modernisation of the semi-periphery and periphery of the capitalist world-system. At 
the same time, it is tempting to counter-modernise these waves and adopt reactionary 
positions proving the existence of irresistible cultural differences and advocating a 
return to tradition along with an apologia for the civilisational uniqueness of specific 
societies, which determines the inapplicability of modern values to them. However, 
acknowledging the challenges of modernisation is by no means the same thing as 
repudiating Modernity per se.
 The thesis of multiple modernities presupposes the preservation of pre-modern 
cultural differences in the value system of Modernity, turning into a civilisational 
approach that only uses the modernist conceptual apparatus and rhetoric for its 
effective refutation. This approach attempts to integrate the universalism of the values 
of Modernity – the background patterns of human development that go beyond the 
limit of any civilisation – with the obvious difference between cultural environments 
and models for their realisation. The vulnerability of the methodological compromise 
inherent in the concept of multiple modernities consists in Modernity in the form of 
competition between various cultural programmes being transformed into an attempt 
to present some particular societies as civilisational models of Modernity, determined 
by the historical and cultural characteristics of world civilisations. However, this 
does not mean that Modernity abolishes the historical civilisations that preceded it; 
on the contrary, civilisations become modern without losing their irresistible cultural 
differences. Thus, the multiplicity of modernity is transformed into a conserved set 
of civilisations in the era of Modernity, comprising an aggregated set of unconnected 
modernities.
 It seems that in reality the fundamental conflict between Modernity and individual 
culturally-based civilisations is essentially impossible since under the conditions of 
modernisation the previous cultural differences invariably depart to the periphery of 
public life. The cultural norms of Modernity may have first appeared in the West, but 
this does not by any means imply colonisation and westernisation when spreading 
beyond it. However, the acceptance of market values, liberalism, democracy, human 
rights, progress, etc. is not equivalent to an undermining of the foundations of any non-
Western culture: these pose a challenge to any previous traditional culture, including 
those of the Western tradition. Therefore, the increasingly popular culture-centric 
concept of multiple modernities results in a fundamental conceptual stretch – cultural 
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factors refer to significant pre-modern differences in human communities, but are 
unlikely to retain such a form under the conditions of global Modernity (Martyanov 2010). 
In this context, any culture is important, but cultural versions cannot be considered as 
dominant explanatory factors within Modernity, whose cultural anamnesis comprises 
the history of the West, albeit freed from its particularity. It seems that the problem of 
the influence of cultural factors in the context of global Modernity is more complex. The 
difficulty lies in the fact that each society seeks to pick up more subtle sociocultural 
settings conducive to an effective combination of market and state regulation in the 
implementation of modern values, taking into account the dependence on prior cultural 
development. Here the adjustment of the cultural environment to the deployment of 
Modernity in a concrete historical society consists solely in a particular problem that is 
overestimated on the increase and located by the proponents of multiple modernities 
at the centre of their conceptual constructions.
 The problem is that the global deployment and intensification of Modernity are 
carried out under the conditions of historical non-simultaneity of different societies. 
This gives rise to intellectual speculations about the insurmountability of cultural 
barriers and traditions of different civilisations, although in fact the cultural unity of 
any modern nation-states was formed simultaneously with their economic and political 
consolidation and did not precede it at all. Moreover, globalisation processes affecting 
politics, culture, economy and law in the modern world dominate the secondary 
reaction to these processes, expressed in attempts at the cultural, ethnic, religious 
fragmentation of the world. Therefore, drawing on the resources of further development 
in pre-modern discourses – historical analogies, civilisational approach, traditionalism, 
fundamentalism and cultural genetics, insurmountable identity or models of ethno-
nationalism – appears as an increasingly effective enterprise.
 Globalised Modernity presupposes the ability of a particular society to live in 
accordance with transnational, universal political rules, while still in the process of 
developing them; to think from universal human positions, taking into account more 
universal laws and background factors that go beyond the limits of sovereign territoriality 
and historical national myths to embrace all of humanity. If the national version of Modernity 
appears as the institutionalisation of a liberal utopia, then the movement towards a 
post-national Modernity turned paradoxically not into denial, but a radicalisation of its 
value bases. For example, A. Giddens views globalisation as the process of Modernity’s 
axiological radicalisation, encompassing the whole world, as it transitions from its limited 
origins to the mature version (Giddens 1990). This transition is characterised by the 
growing dynamics of social changes and the triumph of individuality, radically exempt 
from external regulators and expressed by the growth of conscious or “reflective” sociality 
that comes to replace the social order regulated by society. Globalisation appears as 
mega-trend, increasingly adopting a non-Western view, embracing the world as a whole 
and challenging the customary system of nation-states.
 Global Modernity is less and less consistent with the cultural, geographic and 
historically classical theories of modernisation, trying to build the universal modernist 
hierarchy of the world on a global scale, where the countries of the centre of the world 
system will set the example of the end of history for the ever-lagging periphery, which 
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strives towards capitalism, democracy, nation-state formation, rational bureaucracy, 
autonomy of the individual, separation of power and property, etc. When common 
ideological universals are realised in practice in different regions of the world, 
institutional invariants of the fusion of liberalism, democracy, nationalism and 
capitalism inevitably arise within Modernity. However, the transfer of the model of a 
specific national Modernity in an unchanged form to any other sociocultural reality is 
impossible. For example, political norms in the foundation of a united Europe differ 
fundamentally and in many respects deny the original principles of the European 
nation-based Modernity. Therefore, it is inevitable that the organisation of a political 
society will be transformed into the form of sacralisation of the territoriality of nation-
states in favour of more universal projects that presuppose the whole world and all 
mankind as their place of action.
 It seems that the intermediate stage of the movement from nation-states to 
the global politics of Modernity can be the strengthening of the regulatory role of 
intercountry associations, for example the European Union, various customs and 
currency unions, free trade zones, common markets, etc. Thus the axiological and 
institutional integration of humankind implies a weakening of the geographical and 
political centre in global politics. The centre will function not as an economic monopoly 
or a political hegemon, but rather as a place for the accumulation of resources and the 
imposition of hierarchies and networks across different areas. The centre will be less 
capable of expressing itself institutionally, but more at the level of general rules and 
objectives, i.e. axiologically.
V
From the perspective of its further development, the political project of Modernity 
simultaneously faces significant obstacles and challenges while at the same time its 
potential for maintaining its global dominance is undiminished. In the context of the 
complex processes of modern globalisation, one of the key axiological challenges 
involves the possibility of completing the already existing capitalist world economy to 
conform to a world politics. The increasingly intensive interaction and interdependence 
of humanity at the global level requires the creation of more effective world political 
mechanisms for the regulation of issues concerning the interests of mankind as a 
whole. This problematic preserves the utopian dimension of Modernity, its openness 
to the future and capability of further value-institutional improvement and dominance in 
relation to any alternative projects.
 Presently, increasingly archaic territorial political institutions govern the 
economically globalised world. The economic integration of the world has far outstripped 
the political and ethical. The globalisation of the value bases of Modernity thematises 
the ethical foundations of the limited interests and strategies of nation-states. Global 
politics assumes the alignment of the political, economic and legal space of nations, 
while allowing the maximum cultural diversity: ethnic, religious, linguistic, etc. For 
the first time in human history, global Modernity contains the possibility of creating a 
global politics in which the political domain loses its external space, i.e. the one that is 
traditionally populated with potential enemies.
166 Victor Martianov 
 Potentially, any country and any communicative association – even individual 
people – can become initiators and conveyors of more universal principles of 
Modernity. In the global political discussion about dominant values players will have 
a greatly strengthened a priori position who are able to present to humanity the most 
egalitarian, cosmopolitan variants of solutions for general problems, i.e. those problems 
emanating from the long-term interests of all mankind and not primarily to the benefit 
of individual elites, classes, nations or regions of the world. Such idealistic logic does 
not always bear direct and tangible dividends to the actors and societies that initiate it; 
moreover, these actors often stipulate material costs that are only paid off symbolically. 
As, for example, in the case of the USSR, which helped the world national liberation 
movements and raised its own periphery to the level of the metropolis.
 The new task of states that have lost their habitual functional status of key 
modernisers is not so much the control and distribution of resource flows, but rather 
the provision of infrastructure to support the necessary conditions for the individual and 
collective modernisation of society, which is expressed in the concept of the service 
state. Effective connection to global Modernity and the world economy assumes the path 
of organic modernisation. Here the driving force of social changes is associated with 
the creation of institutional opportunities for expanding the available range of the self-
realisation of citizens in the context of the increasing influence of post-material values.
 Any nation can improve its position in the world system not only in economic 
terms, but also in terms of caring about a common future in which there is a worthy 
place for everyone (Martianov, Fishman, 2010). The future comes first of all as an 
ethical turn towards a new value system. We do not know what the future will be, but 
we can know how it should be. Elements of global political ethics are currently being 
developed in alternative globalisation, communitarian, cosmopolitan, environmental, 
anarchist and technocratic discourses, including those directed against the costs 
of the dominant neoliberal model of modern globalisation. In particular, the work of 
researchers including S. George, A. Buzgalin, B. Kagarlitsky, A. Callinicos, E. Laclau, 
C. Mouffe, F. Jameson, S. Žižek and others, who advocate alternative mechanisms 
for the globalisation of Modernity, also obtains a significant ethical charge through its 
adherence to a neo-Marxist or post-Marxist vision of the globalised world. However, 
this kind of ethics is typically built on opposition to the secondary costs of globalisation, 
acquiring the character of extremist endeavours seeking to turn the history of mankind 
back to some idealised fork at which it left the true path of development, whether that 
be fundamentalism, terrorism or extremism. In reality, such criticism, exaggerating all 
the complexity and duality of the development processes of the modern world, only 
strengthens its objects.
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